How decisions are made

The published memoirs of former prime minister Taher Masri, being serialised currently in a Jordanian daily, project a microimage of the decision-making process in the Royal Palace during the decisive periods of the first Gulf War, in the aftermath of the Oslo Accords and during the geopolitical imperatives that led to the Jordanian-Israeli peace treaty in October 1994.

Masri was a member of the inner circle of King Hussein for five decades, when he served as speaker of Parliament, or as head of the Senate, or as a prime minister and an elected member of Parliament.

Despite the misleading impression that King Hussein was in daily contact with Saddam Hussein, exchanging views and planning new strategies regarding Saudi Arabia, the memoirs show that Saddam refused to answer a letter sent to him at the earlier stages of the war and dropped any contact with Amman. Even phone calls from the King were ignored.

When PLO chairman Yasser Arafat visited Iraq during the war, he came to the Royal Palace to announce that Saddam cannot be found in Iraq, and nobody knew where he was. 

But Jordan knew that the letter written by the King’s adviser, Adnan Abu Odeh, had provoked Saddam’s fury due to its harsh language regarding military action against brotherly Gulf countries.

For months, Arab heads of state and American officials asked Jordan to intercede with Baghdad, whose leader was not even on speaking terms with King Hussein.

Another chapter of the memoirs deals with the Oslo Accords struck by Palestinians and Israelis. 

King Hussein was taken by total surprise when the media leaked the news.

He talked on Jordan Television, where he addressed Palestinians and Jordanians, describing the accords as a stab in the back for the full rights of the Palestinian people, and especially the refugees’ right of return to their homeland.

But his anger fumed down three days later when the US expressed support for Oslo.

The memoirs describe the King’s angry reaction when he heard Masri saying that Jordan should be angrier with the Americans and the Israelis who did not share the information with Amman.

During his tenure as prime minister, Masri was asked to put in writing the conditions for Jordan’s signing a peace treaty with Israel.

Five of his Cabinet ministers resigned since they rejected its terms and formulated articles.

When another Cabinet signed the 1994 peace treaty, some of Masri’s conditions were not met, or were neglected, an act which made him refuse to give his endorsement as a parliamentarian to the treaty.

The memoirs provide a clue to the inner workings of the chambers of the Royal Court, the Prime Ministry and the bicameral Parliament.

It elaborates in meticulous detail how major decisions are made, and how decisive choices affecting the lives of thousands are concluded.