What does Israel want from Syria?

Israel continues to carry out targeted and powerful strikes deep inside Syrian territory. The stated objective is to prevent any actor from exploiting Syria’s geography to establish armed footholds or amass weaponry that could pose a threat to Israel’s security, including a Turkish military presence. From the Israeli point of view, the removal of Iran from Syria should not translate into Turkey stepping into its place. Thus, what Israel is pursuing today goes beyond securing its immediate borders and aims to reshape Syria’s security, geography and political orientation altogether

This escalation, however, is not confined to Syria. The renewed war in Gaza, the efforts to shift dynamics in the West Bank and the ongoing operations in Lebanon all point to a broader phase of escalation that transcends mere US approval, it verges on direct American involvement. Washington is now engaging directly in Yemen, launching strikes against the Houthis, and even issuing unprecedented threats of military action against Iran. This American escalation will likely force Tehran to seek de-escalation through one of two tracks: either via diplomatic flexibility and dialogue, or by intensifying indirect confrontation through Israel’s neighboring fronts. Anticipating this, Israel is fortifying those fronts pre-emptively, and its reach could well extend to more distant arenas like Iraq, to prevent their use in future operations targeting Israel.

Israel’s growing pressure on Syria also signals a clear intention to redraw Syria’s political map. This strategy sets a critical test for the new Syrian leadership: how to respond to Israel’s intensifying posture, with very limited strategic options. The idea of securing regional backing from Turkey might sound plausible in theory, but in practice, amid today’s escalation and Washington’s clear alignment with Israeli policies, this remains unlikely. The point is made even clearer as Israel directly targets areas within Syria that Turkey had previously expressed interest in converting into military bases. Ankara’s response came via Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan, who stated that Turkey does not seek confrontation with Israel in Syria. He went further, indicating that if Damascus wishes to pursue “certain understandings” with Israel, that remains Syria’s own prerogative.

With regional options narrowing and international alliances proving unreliable, the Syrian regime may find itself compelled to pursue direct understandings with the United States. But the American stance on Syria remains ambiguous, and the continuation of sanctions further complicates the landscape. In this context, US acceptance might emerge as the only viable path forward for Damascus. Yet the crucial question remains, what does Washington want from the Syrian regime? From internal policy reforms to what US Middle East envoy Steve Witkoff recently hinted, the possible inclusion of Syria and Lebanon in the Abraham Accords, the scope of expectation is wide and politically weighty.

So, at a moment when the threat to Iran has become distinctly American rather than merely Israeli, Israel is leveraging its own escalation strategy to carve out a new reality on the ground. Even the idea of redefining relationships with its neighbors through peace agreements, including Syria and Lebanon, does not currently appeal to Israel. Why should it, when it is effectively enforcing its will without the need for diplomatic legitimization? However, should Israel succeed in locking in this new reality, peace agreements could later become a tool to formalise what has already been established, not through negotiation, but through force.