From Lebanon to Syria: Toward a new phase of regional conflict

With the implementation of the ceasefire agreement in Lebanon, Israel has adopted a similar strategy to that employed in Gaza. The ceasefire here serves as a mechanism to de-escalate combat operations while keeping the frontlines open. Israel retains the right to conduct intelligence-driven operations aimed at preventing Hizbollah from repositioning or expanding its presence in southern Lebanon. At the same time, Israel’s broader objective appears to be pushing Hezbollah to relocate its remaining military assets outside Lebanese territory, where they would be more vulnerable to targeted strikes. In the coming weeks, Israel is expected to bolster its presence across wide areas of southern Lebanon and enforce a stringent intelligence blockade under the pretext of monitoring border activities and preventing potential breaches of the ceasefire agreement.

While the Lebanese front has relatively calmed, events have rapidly escalated on the Syrian front, as previously anticipated. The recent movement of some armed factions toward Aleppo raises the prospect of Syria once again becoming a theater of armed conflict. These developments highlight the interconnected nature of the Syrian, Lebanese and Iraqi fronts, suggesting that the current escalation could grow more intense in the coming days and potentially extend geographically to other regions within Syria, particularly those near the Iraqi border. This shifting reality may prompt various actors to reposition themselves, whether to protect their interests or to establish new facts on the ground amidst the swiftly changing dynamics in Syria, and, to some extent, Iraq.

The Syrian landscape today differs significantly from its earlier phases, which saw intense activity by armed factions. Years of prolonged conflict have exhausted the internal capacity of Syria and weakened the Syrian army’s ability to reclaim territory without the support of its allies. Russia, a key backer, is now constrained by its ongoing conflict in Ukraine, with recent precision missile strikes targeting its territories under what appears to be American authorisation. This evolving situation compels Moscow to avoid being drawn into another protracted and undefined conflict, focusing instead on preserving strategic areas vital to its interests, such as Tartus, Latakia, Damascus and its surroundings.

Iran, similarly, finds itself increasingly drained after a year of expanded confrontations, from Gaza to other fronts where the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps and its allies operate. Most notably, Hizbollah, which has played a pivotal role in shifting the balance of power in Syrian battles, now faces diminished capabilities after sustaining significant blows. This new reality limits its military effectiveness and leaves the group at risk of further attrition.

The Iraqi militias operating on Syrian soil may also become targets of attacks by multiple parties. Even before this escalation, Syria had been witnessing the emergence of various actors seeking to redefine their roles and presence in areas like Deir Ezzor, Sweida, Al Qa’im, and Al Bukamal. Kurdish regions, situated near these hotspots, are similarly likely to face new challenges. Having previously dealt with the threat of Daesh, the Kurds may now find themselves navigating confrontations with diverse forces amid emerging complexities on the ground.

Notably, recent military activity is not limited to factions like, Hay’at Tahrir Al Sham (HTS) or Al Nusra front in general, but includes the resurgence of Daesh in areas such as Palmyra and southern Syria. While the group has suffered recent setbacks from the Syrian army and Russian air strikes, ongoing escalation could enable its return with new tactics to reassert its influence in specific regions, particularly southern Syria and the desert areas.

The conflict’s shift to the Syrian front reflects the persistence of the broader war waged by Israel against Iran and its allies. The intensifying events in Syria signal the region’s entry into a new phase, fundamentally different from the conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon. This phase is marked by the emergence of new actors seeking to reshape the region’s geography and impose fresh political and security realities.

From Jordan’s perspective, the country faces complex security challenges as the likelihood of direct confrontations near its northern and eastern borders grows. The continuation and expansion of the conflict, alongside the appearance of new actors near Jordan’s border regions, heighten the risk of potential threats to its territorial integrity.

Addressing these challenges requires a comprehensive security strategy centered on proactive measures to prevent border violations and enhance the country’s state of readiness. Safeguarding internal stability and preventing the spillover of the crisis into Jordanian territory also necessitate transparent governmental communication. Such communication should highlight the scale of the surrounding threats, foster national solidarity, and encourage a collective sense of responsibility. This is particularly crucial in what may be the region’s most sensitive and precarious phase in years, with the entire area teetering on “shifting sands” capable of rapidly igniting crises in unexpected ways and locations.