Cross-border threats: How Jordan braces for next phase

As the conflict in Lebanon continues to escalate, expanding further into Lebanese and Syrian territories, the Israeli military is increasingly focused on severing supply lines to Hizbollah. Israel is prioritising the isolation of Syrian territory, seeking to remove it from the conflict equation, either by disrupting lines of communication or blocking pro-Iranian factions from activating the Golan front. These factions, aligned with Iran, have aimed to penetrate Israeli territory with drones.

Israel's intensified tactics and increased pace of operations may lead to the widening of targeted areas to include other fronts that it considers direct threats. This expansion could extend into Iraq, particularly with the entry of Iraqi resistance factions into direct confrontation, through both rocket launches and drone attacks against Israel. This complex and interconnected situation could result in further escalations, creating a phase of unpredictable retaliation in the region.

With expanding conflict and intensified attacks, the region is entering a broader confrontation, marked by uncertain responses. The expanded geography of this conflict means Jordan now faces a more complex and increasingly risky scenario shaped by overlapping regional threats. This, especially with the region moving toward "decentralised" militant actions, emphasises individual fighters' decisions within these organisations and militias, who are compelled to adopt this approach as a survival strategy. Though this individualised mode of operation may be temporary, it could undoubtedly present significant security challenges soon for Jordan. The aerial security challenge and attempts to breach its airspace may coincide with threats to its land borders and even domestically.

For Jordan, the shift in confrontations involving Iraqi factions means the country is now surrounded by open fronts to the north and east. Added to this is the primary challenge of the Israeli border, where recent escalations have led Israel to deem this a "high-risk" boundary and to adopt new, specialised security measures, including forming a dedicated military unit to secure this border.

These challenges put Jordan in the midst of a storm of threats from multiple directions, making it a potential target for actions by various groups. Consequently, Jordan could find itself compelled to address cross-border threats, especially with the increasing prevalence of drone attacks. Such risks, both organised and random, pose threats to critical infrastructure areas, including energy and other key facilities. Jordan’s security concerns over its airspace and land borders are likely to coincide with internal security risks as well.

Jordan’s borders, long challenged by narcotics and arms trafficking, now face the possibility of direct military targeting, as regional powers may attempt to shift the conflict onto Jordanian soil. Such developments align with the agendas of various actors, including those with opposing interests. This makes border security and domestic stability Jordan’s central focus in this phase.

Concurrently, persistent crises and border disruptions make it essential to consider alternate strategies that balance risk management with opportunity. Transforming Jordan’s borders into potential threats calls for exploring the southern boundary with Saudi Arabia, which could be leveraged through a multi-tiered cooperation policy. Strengthening this southern border for security and economic collaboration becomes crucial at this juncture, offering a positive outlet as other borders remain under threat.

Jordan's stability remains the highest priority. To prevent external unrest from spilling over into Jordanian territory requires a comprehensive security strategy backed by a robust political vision. This vision must clearly communicate the scale of surrounding threats and the speed at which they could spill into Jordan, as the region’s shifting crises resemble a field of moving sands, readily spreading from one place to another.