The battle for Britain

The outcome of the United Kingdom’s general election this week will set the direction the country will take in its long-term relations with the European Union.

And yet, with the unfortunate exception of the UK Independence Party, the question went mostly unaddressed during the campaign.

But voters know that it could soon move to the centre of British politics, regardless of whether the Conservatives are returned to power or are replaced by Labour.

Britain is not quite certain about its role in Europe. It had hoped that a larger EU would be less integrated. But the EU’s enlargement in 2004 failed to stop the momentum towards “ever-closer union”. Of the 10 countries that joined then, seven are now in the eurozone.

Whatever problems the UK faces now pale in comparison to those that would emerge if it were to withdraw from the EU.

Indeed, the British people would likely realise only after the fact that the problems they attributed to the EU actually originate at home.

The problem now is that the British stance is strengthening the centrifugal forces now at work in the EU.

Prime Minister David Cameron’s promise to hold a referendum on membership by 2017 if he is re-elected is not helpful in solving the problems that Britain and the rest of Europe face together: the need for higher growth and greater social inclusion amid unprecedented foreign-policy challenges.

Thus, there is a certain paradox in Britain’s acting as it does.

The very possibility of “Brexit” contradicts everything that the British had sought to build over the years in Europe, particularly the common market.

Britons of all political stripes should recognise their country’s indispensability in the further development of the common market and in mapping out economic governance in a way that serves everyone’s interests.

At the same time, we must confront the fact that the UK’s deep divisions on Europe will not disappear, regardless of the election’s outcome. The debate about the EU is too ingrained in British discourse. That is why it is important to reiterate that the EU member states are not about to agree to any “renationalisation” negotiations on the union’s powers that require treaty-level changes affecting the common market’s core components, such as the free movement of people. 

Likewise, it must be made clear that the EU will not revise the UK’s terms of membership at the cost of further progress on urgently needed reforms.

But EU-British relations need not be antagonistic.

In fact, the European Commission has been sounding distinctly British in recent months, with promises to limit — and even repeal — parts of European legislation deemed too intrusive or impediments to economic growth.

Indeed, the preparations for negotiations on a new agreement among the EU institutions are less focused on the nature of the output of the legislation than on the sheer number of laws now on the books. This approach can be promising in terms of the dialogue with the new British government.

And yet, although a new European Treaty might not emerge in the coming years, limiting further integration, the makeshift response to Europe’s economic crisis has fuelled calls for a new legal basis for continuing the necessary eurozone reforms. 

As a result, work on a new treaty, initiated by the European Parliament Committee on Constitutional Affairs, will soon be taken up by other European institutions.

What will most likely emerge is a eurozone pact that member states can sign and ratify at will, making it impossible to veto.

One step in preparing for a possible withdrawal has been the British government’s decision to undertake a wide-ranging review of the EU’s powers and their impact on the UK.

The purpose of the review was to determine whether the division of competences between the EU and UK was, broadly speaking, appropriate.

The outcome, it must be said, was substantive and objective — which is promising in terms of moving from populist pronouncements to serious dialogue.

Interestingly, the British government’s review does not mention the need to transfer to the national level any of the competences defined by the Treaty of Lisbon, which would require the unanimous consent of the member states (and thus can be ruled out as a possibility).

But some powers could be renationalised at a level lower than primary law, without treaty changes, primarily through a shift in the roles of the EU and the British government in the case of shared powers. 

So perhaps achieving the Cameron government’s objective — to remain in a reformed EU after renegotiating the UK’s membership and renationalising certain European competences — does not actually require treaty modification.

I hope the new British government will view matters this way, because the economic, legal and political consequences of Brexit would be severe.

Exchanging EU membership for membership in the European Economic Area — along with Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein — would mean losing all influence over the shape of the internal market and the EU budget.

So would the Swiss option of concluding bilateral agreements with the EU (which member states, moreover, would be unlikely to accept).

A better governed, more growth-oriented Europe is in the fundamental interest of the UK and the EU alike. That fact should not be lost in the days ahead.

The writer is chair of the European Parliament’s Committee on Constitutional Affairs. ©Project Syndicate, 2015. www.project-syndicate.org