A look at US-Israeli ties

The US-Israel relationship from Truman to Obama

Dennis Ross, Farrar, Straus and Giroux

New York, 2015

Pp. 474

Dennis Ross was the director of policy planning in the State Department under George H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton’s Middle East peace envoy and also served as a special assistant to President Barack Obama.

For 40 years he has been in player and close observer of the Middle East and US-Israel relations. In this book he provides an insider look at polices towards Israel pursued from the Truman administration to the present and how they have affected America’s relationships in the Middle East. James Baker, US Secretary of State, referred to Ross as a man whom he called “our peace process junkie”.

This is Ross’ fourth book on the US policies regarding the Middle East, particularly the Israel-Palestinian conflict. Although the book title suggests that it is mainly concerned with the US-Israel relationship over the last few decades, it is mainly about the Middle East conflict; because it is this conflict that shaped this relationship.

In Ross terms there are “three wrong perceptions” that the State Department has held from 1948 until this very day. The first one is “the need to distance [itself] from Israel to gain Arab responsiveness”. The second mistake is “concern about the high costs of cooperating with the Israelis”. Their third error is “the belief that resolving the Palestinian problem is the key to improving the US position in the region”. But are these really wrong perceptions!

Ross is a controversial figure in Palestine and the Arab region. He is accused of being biased towards Israel interests rather than acting as an honest mediator. I recall that few years ago, during a lecture at the Foreign Affairs Council in Amman, one of the Palestinian delegates to the negotiations disclosed that when Shlomo Ben Ami, Israel minister of foreign affairs then, presented conciliatory views about the future of Jerusalem, it was Ross how tried to silence him and prevented the negotiations proceeding along the Ben Ami’s “progressive” parameters.

It is not possible in this short review to cover the many chapters of this relatively large book which spans over the period from the Truman administration of the 1940s to the present day. But I found the most interesting part is Chapter 9 “The Clinton Administration and Israel: Strategic partners for Peace”. Since his election in 1992, and over his term in White House (1993-2001), Clinton made peace in the Middle East one of his priorities, and this seemed possible under the regional realities that existed at that time. 

The negotiations which Clinton supervised, in the 2000 Camp David Summit, between Arafat and Barak, the Israeli prime minister then, was the nearest that the Palestinian-Israeli sides came into a possible peace and realistic parameters were set up. At the last week of 2000, there were prospects for an accord, but (as usual) Arafat demurred. I recall that Clinton in a later speech wondered that he could not comprehend why Arafat did not endorse what he felt was a fair agreement. At the end of his term in 2001, when Arafat phoned him and told him that he was a great man, Clinton responded “Mr Chairman, I am not a great man. I am a failure, and you have made me one”. 

Many years later, with the present impasse and with the mounting Palestinian suffering, one has to wonder was Camp David a missed opportunity.

This new Ross book was extensively reviewed. But the most telling review was that of Akiva Eldar, the veteran Israeli journalist who was Haaretz diplomatic correspondent. Writing in Haaretz in November 9th he provided a most critical evaluation of the US-Israeli relationship. In his view and in the eyes of most Israelis the equation is simple: Count the number of dollars the US puts in Israeli pockets; add to this the number of vetoes the US has used to protect Israel in international organisations, saving it from sanctions and condemnations; and tally the number of hours that Ross, Abrams and their associates spent in futile negotiations that left Israel with more settlements and less peace. 

The result is an “unshakable relationship”. To be sure, even such steadfast relationships have their ups and downs.

Eldar went on to say — “there are also Israelis, and others who care very much about Israel, who strongly believe that almost 50 years of living under occupation (yes, the occupier also lives under occupation) is to a great extent a result of the “special relationship” between the US and Israel. 

They believe that a true friend of Israel must use its influence to save the country from turning into an apartheid pariah state. Many liberal Israelis blame American politicians for spoiling and coddling Israel, for turning a blind eye to its self-destructive interests.

In Eldar’s brilliant analysis, Ross “completely ignores this serial blunder, preferring to focus on the ‘successful’ bilateral relationship between the US and Israel. Having followed Ross’ conduct for many years, and the perceptions he injected into every administration he served, I strongly believe that he is largely responsible for the notion that the US needs to put Israel’s interests before those of the Palestinians. He maintained that the Arabs must take into consideration the domestic constraints of Israel’s electoral system”.

“Throughout his diplomatic career, Ross kept reiterating that the US must tailor its policy regarding the Israeli-Arab diplomatic process to fit those constraints, while ignoring the Arab regimes’ limited manoeuvrability when it comes to Jerusalem’s holy sites and the settlements policy. At the same time, he virtually ignored Israel’s violations of basic Palestinian human rights and the expansion of settlements. During negotiations, Ross Instead of putting a blueprint on the table, he kept pressing the Palestinians and the Syrians to adopt more ‘confidence-building measures’, in the hopes of creating a better atmosphere, while Israel kept building settlements, creating more facts on the ground and poisoning the atmosphere”.