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The only option for Syria
Feb 01,2014 - Last updated at Feb 01,2014
It was a foregone conclusion that the Geneva II conference was doomed to fail, no so much because Washington and Moscow do not see eye to eye on the terms of a solution, but rather because the facts on the ground do not lend support to a compromise between the two warring parties.
Damascus has no incentive to reach a solution at the expense of its ironclad principles as long as its forces have the upper hand on the battlefield.
The opposition forces, poorly armed, divided and in disarray, have only one solution under the circumstances: surrender to the Syrian government.
The US and Russia would be naive to expect an amicable and durable solution for Syria along the lines of the Geneva I communiqué as long as one side has the upper hand in the conflict.
Strengthening the hands of the moderate opposition may have been necessary before a real progress could be expected at the negotiating table.
There is no escape from the conclusion that a forceful Arab intervention to end the armed conflict in Syria is now the only option left.
With the UN Security Council deadlocked on Syria and the major powers reluctant to intervene militarily to end the civil war, the Arab countries should take a measure of last resort: assemble a large peacemaking force backed by
airpower to intervene in Syria and end the fighting.
The Charter of the Arab League envisages such an intervention in the case of a bloody conflict in any given Arab country that develops into a sectarian conflict threatening to spill over into neighbouring Arab countries.
Like-minded Arab capitals cannot afford to stay on the sidelines and watch the war in Syria for much longer.
Rather than wait for foreign nations to stop the bleeding in Syria, the Arab world has the moral, political and military responsibility to act.
An appropriate decision by the Arab League authorising the formation of an Arab peace-making force is, therefore, the only remaining option left to end the crisis in Syria.