Pearl Harbour to October 7: How intelligence failures enabled surprise attacks

The Pearl Harbour operation occurred on December 7, 1941, when the Japanese naval air force launched a surprise attack on the US naval base in Pearl Harbour, Hawaii. The United States was in a state of relative neutrality at the time and was not participating in World War II.

The Pearl Harbour operation sparked widespread controversy over whether the US administration had prior knowledge of the attack. Some evidence suggests that the United States had received signals and warnings about Japan’s aggressive intentions, but there was no confirmed information about the timing or target of the attack. Several subsequent investigations have shown that there was a failure to exchange information between various intelligence agencies and the US military, which led to insufficient defensive measures being taken.

There were warning signals, such as Japanese codebreaking that indicated the possibility of an attack, but they were not clear enough to predict Pearl Harbour. The information failed to be analysed and exchanged effectively between different departments. Some US officials dismissed the warnings as unconfirmed or exaggerated.

In the October 7, 2023 operation, Israel experienced a surprise attack by Hamas, which resulted in significant loss of life and property. This attack came amid rising tensions between Israel and the Palestinians in Gaza and the West Bank.

This operation also raised questions about the extent to which Israeli security services were aware of Hamas’s preparations for this attack. Despite Israel’s advanced intelligence capabilities, the attack came as a major surprise.

Despite repeated warnings of a possible escalation by Hamas, there was no precise information about the timing or extent of the attack. Some reports indicated that there were intelligence warnings from some of Israel’s allies, but they were not taken seriously or were not dealt with effectively.

There was a failure in analysing and exchanging intelligence information between the various agencies, which led to Israel being surprised by the attack.

First: Comparison in terms of advance knowledge, information exchange and analysis. In both cases, there was a deficiency in the exchange and analysis of intelligence information between the various agencies. In Pearl Harbour, the United States failed to coordinate the information it had about Japan’s intentions. Likewise, on October 7, Israel failed to deal effectively with warnings and intelligence assessments about Hamas’s intentions.

Second: Threat assessment. In Pearl Harbour, the United States did not expect an attack of this magnitude on the naval base in Hawaii, and was focused on Japan’s movements in other areas. On October 7, Israel was aware of tensions with Hamas, but did not expect an attack of this magnitude and intensity.

Third: Defensive preparations. In both cases, both sides failed to take adequate defensive measures. The United States was not adequately prepared in Pearl Harbour, and Israel did not take adequate defensive measures to confront the attack on October 7.

Fourth: Consequences. The attack on Pearl Harbour led to the entry of the United States into World War II, which changed the course of history. Similarly, the October 7 operation greatly affected Israeli-Palestinian relations and led to a major military and political escalation in the region.

A comparison between the Pearl Harbour and October 7 operations shows that both attacks had a major impact as a result of the failure to assess the threat and exchange information effectively. In both cases, there were warnings, but they were not taken seriously enough or were ignored. The consequences were huge and influential on both the military and political levels. It can be said that the failure to analyse and exchange intelligence effectively can lead to dire consequences, and this is a lesson that countries must learn to ensure their readiness to confront future threats.

In the Pearl Harbour operation and the October 7 attack, both warnings were ignored for political and strategic reasons. In Pearl Harbour, warnings about the Pearl Harbour attack were not taken seriously enough because the United States was focused on the Russian advance and the division of Germany after World War II. American estimates were focused on stopping threats in Europe and Asia, by launching a nuclear strike on Hiroshima and Nagasaki to stop the Russian advance, which did not possess the atomic bomb at that time, meaning warning the Soviet Union at that time. These strategic and geopolitical factors made America ignore security warnings about the possible attack.

As for the attack on October 7, warnings of an attack by Hamas on Israel were not taken seriously enough either. The Israeli authorities were preoccupied with internal and regional issues such as the evacuation of Gaza of its people and the start of the Ben Gurion Canal project and the Indo-Arab-Israeli Corridor, which is considered a counter-initiative to the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative. These economic and geopolitical factors made Israel ignore security warnings about a possible attack. Finally: In both cases, the focus on larger strategic issues allowed these attacks with dire consequences. For more important purposes, attention is balanced between current threats and long-term strategic and political projects to ensure political stability and national security.

Hasan Dajah is professor of strategic studies at Al Hussein Bin Talal University