Israel’s security and its Middle Eastern identity

The title may be shocking to some. It was not inspired by the Israeli caretaker prime minister Yair Lapid's recent statements, nor by statements of US president Joe Biden on the eve of his visit to the Middle East, but rather from several press statements by Biden weeks ago. While I initially hesitated on whether to write this article, the nature of US and Israeli positions — which appear to target public opinion in the US, Israel and the Arab world more so than the actual agenda of Biden's visit — requires some light to be shed.

While I have always felt that delving too deeply into history could (under certain circumstances) shake the ground under my feet, some recent history surrounding the Arab and Palestinian-Israeli conflict is indeed required. In particular, speaking of Israel's status in the Middle East and its security necessitates pointing to several matters:   

UN envoy Gunnar Yaring's efforts to implement UN Security Council Resolution 242 (1967) were unsuccessful. Failure to reach full implementation has also been due to Israeli delays, lack of international will and contradictions in some Arab positions, in addition to the “culture shock” of accepting Israel’s existence, and most importantly the absence of direct Palestinians representation. This led to the 1973 war, the subsequent Camp David agreement, and the recognition of the Palestine Liberation Organisation as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people in 1974. This then facilitated a US-Palestinian dialogue in Tunisia during the eighties, followed by the Jordanian disengagement from the West Bank, to pave the way for Palestinians to declare a Palestinian State at the Algiers Summit in 1988. And, three years later (when regional and international circumstances permitted), Jordan presented the Palestinians with the political umbrella to represent their own interests in the Madrid Peace Conference, leading to the Oslo Agreement and its aftermath, which ultimately also paved the way for the Palestinian leadership to reach Palestinian land, and the establishment of the Palestinian National Authority.

While the aforementioned is a summary of historical events that anyone can choose to access, what I aim to do is affirm that “believing in peace” or a “culture of peace” must be accompanied by a mental and cultural state that is based on justice, in order for nations to both accept it and support it. The late president Anwar Sadat's assassination came after an agreement that resulted in a cultural turn, as it had challenged a saying that called for'ending Israeli presence on historical Palestine'. Then came the assassination of Yitzhak Rabin, after achieving another cultural turn, this time on the Israeli side, represented in the acceptance of the Palestinian national political identity on part of historical Palestine, as a prelude to a Palestinian state (albeit under special conditions — de-militarised). While extremism did not rule the Egyptian side after Sadat's assassination, it unfortunately began to uproot the culture of peace from the Israeli mentality post-Rabin, as witnessed in successive political victories of the extreme right (which did not allow the left to lead, with the exception to a short period under Ehud Barak). When meeting the late Yasser Arafat in Pretoria in 2001, I asked about the main reason for the failure of the Cairo talks with Barak, to which he responded: Would you allow Israel to have sovereignty of the land under Al Aqsa? At that point, I was convinced that the culture of peace in Israel was in danger, sadly at a time when the next Israeli prime minister was meant to inherit Rabin's courage to achieve a peace that was accepted by himself and Arafat, and one to which the American side and the late King Hussein, may his soul rest in peace, testified to.

To nurture the process of erasing the culture of peace in historical Palestine, Sharon invaded Al Aqsa Mosque in the summer of 2001. Since then, the political role of religious and right-wing extremism has doubled. It did not stop at freezing the peace process, but continued with successive violations, which led to the loss of hope and belief in peace among a large percentage of the Palestinian public opinion, and ultimately a second Intifada. If the ruling Israeli right’s practice of favouring and supporting extremists continues, the third Intifada will be on its way, and everyone will be scorched by its fire, first and foremost the Israelis, after their continued attacks in Jerusalem (as seen both this year and last),which violate agreements, including the peace agreement with Jordan.

The aforementioned is a brief description of the situation inside historical Palestine. Beyond this, Israel is concerned about the regional struggles, the Iranian nuclear file, Iran's support to Hizbollah in Lebanon and the Houthis in Yemen; but Israeli tears over these complaints cannot wash away Palestinian blood shed at the hands of the ruling extreme right-wing coalition (as measures targeting Palestinian blood are no longer linked to extremist settlers, but rather to official Israeli government and military sponsorship). Moreover, Israeli leaders have tried to capitalise on the stances of the previous Republican US administration, but this did not materialise. On this matter, any level-headed individual would point tothe role of Jordan under His Majesty King Abdullah’s leadership, and the solid stance adopted to derail these efforts. In Jordan, we are convinced that the right time will come when the latest agreements between Israel and Gulf states can be invested to serve the interests of Palestinians.This has been displayed in these countries’ political positions in several occasions, calling on Israel to uphold international agreements and to work towards the establishment of an independent Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital (two-state solution), in addition to ongoing Arab commitment to the Arab Peace Initiative (2002).

It has become clear that the US agenda for Biden's visit includes:

Confirming commitment to Israel's security and expanding its air defence system (NATO model and framework), as well as affirming that Israel’s security will be a subject of discussion with Arab leaders.

Weak political promises to the Palestinian side, especially amid the absence of clear ideas that would pave the way for serious US political action, at a time when the provision of aid is seen as sufficient.

The most important agenda for the Jeddah meetings, in my opinion, are as follows:

Opening a new page for US-Saudi relations that transcend the tensions of the last three years.

Laying new and strategic foundations for oil and economic relations, beyond a purely economic dimension (although US position in 1973 was against the idea of ​​using oil as a strategic weapon).

Putting forward ideas of a defence alliance for a group of Middle Eastern countries (not necessarily including Israel) to achieve two goals: 1) a message of pressure on Iran, to be used in the next stage of resuming negotiations on the nuclear file; 2) a message to both Russia and China that the Arab alliance is a friend of the US and its future strategic goals.

As for the Arab agenda, inter-Arab contacts during the past month may point at the least to a minimal understanding between the participating capitals. Based on follow-up and observations, one can assess that these understandings include: 

Supporting oil-producing Arab countries in their oil policies.

Not accepting a defensive military alliance (alliance cannot be offensive) with Israel as a member state, unless the conditions of its Middle Eastern identity are met (beyond just geography; rather, commitment to international principles of good neighbourliness). 

Preserving strategic relations and friendship between Washington and the Arab capitals, while making sure that this does not mean entering into a new cold war produced by the Russian-Ukrainian war.

Moreover, it is a clear that there is an Arab conviction on the need to resume the peace process and put in place clear ideas towards reaching a two state solution; and, as has been affirmed by His Majesty King Abdullah countless times, the Palestinian issue is the region’s first and central issue. Hence, His Majesty is expected to raise this once again, and to explain that international developments should not prevent the US — which is a friend of all parties to the conflict — from making a distinguished effort in this sensitive stage of international affairs, and to avoid a bloody clash within the borders of historical Palestine.

Before further addressing Israel’s security and Middle Eastern identity, which had been referenced by Israeli leaders, US presidency and White House advisers, I want to point to a critical historical turning point. When nations came together in San Francisco to establish the United Nations in 1945 to inherit the League of Nations, the goal was to prevent a return to a situation similar to the scourge of World War II, and to ensure that international relations are based on the principle of cooperation, not power. But, the ambitions of the victors surpassed these hopes and dreams, along with ongoing policies of mandates and colonialism, including the establishment of the State of Israel on the land of Palestine. After 74 years and despite the peace agreements since Camp David, up to the Abrahamic agreements, and what was produced by the Madrid Peace Conference, Israel's Middle Eastern identity is still shaky, and the main reason is that Israel’s “security” stems from its closed inward perspective.

It is clear that Israel's defence strategy is based on building a striking military power capable of confronting its neighbours’ military capabilities, including countries with which it shares peace treaties (and security coordination) — which, as some analysts portray, may be in part linked to the Jewish people's historical and psychical experiences, including in Europe over the past two centuries. 

However, the Israeli policy has not been able to understand the simple rules of political sociology: One cannot sleep in peace if the person next to him is affected by his oppression, let alone, if the oppressed is inside your house, not merelyin your neighborhood. 

Here, I must reiterate that the greatest crime committed by the Israeli extremist right is to destroy the culture of peace among the young Israeli generations (the voters), which simultaneously also led to the destruction of a belief in peace among Arab citizens, especially Palestinian youth.

The message that has long been conveyed, even by Israeli intellectuals, is that the Israeli leadership cannot establish a model for an apartheid state within the framework of the one-state solution, as demography will transform it into a Palestinian state, as was the case before the British Mandate. At the same time, the Israelileadership cannot expel millions outside its borders. Therefore, the objective solution remains to reach a two-state solution and to restore the peace process and peace relations to the way initially envisioned and desired by the brave peace pioneers, Rabin and Arafat.

Today, and via repeated elections, leaders in Israel are avoiding having to sit down and objectively discuss the situation with their allies in Washington and their partners in the peace process, but they are aware that this does not change the realities of geography, demography and historical imperatives. Therefore, the question is: Can Israel again produce a courageous leadership similar to Rabin?

Israel’s permanent security and its Middle Eastern identity does not lay in an Israeli decision, military capability or US support. Rather, it comes with minimal financial and social cost, when Israel’s Arab neighbours accept this [Israeli] security, and when Israel as a Middle East neighbor supports cooperation that benefits all. The condition for this is clear: Establishing an independent and viable Palestinians state, and commitment to international legitimacy. So when will Israeli leaders realise their historical responsibility to their future generations?