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Forming a national salvation gov’t mandate given to Razzaz
Jun 10,2018 - Last updated at Jun 10,2018
There are key takeaways from last week that must be noted if only to record a historical moment of national pride. His Majesty King Abdullah embraced Jordanians unconditionally and publicly declared his respect for their political judgment; outgoing prime minister Hani Mulki and his government were given, and took, the opportunity to bow out with grace and dignity despite the loud demonstrations and demands for their ouster, and finally Omar Razzaz, a politically-savvy intellectual in touch with the pulse of Jordanians, was appointed as prime minister designate. Those three men, and with them the thousands of Jordanian activists and citizens who delivered the decisive message of political will, including all the security apparatus who safeguarded the process, have made Jordan proud.
As this week rolls in, we look forward to the naming of a new Cabinet and with it, Jordanians hope, Jordan’s executive authority will be expected to focus its effort on leading citizen-centric transformative reforms to help Jordan begin to shed the rentier state label and, hopefully, launch a productive economy, legitimised by political openness and democratic expression.
And it would be futile to second-guess or try to look too far into the future to predict how this new government will implement its reform plan but it makes sense, at this moment, to weigh in on how Razzaz will form his government. And in that regard we can certainly ask strategic questions to guesstimate what political hand Razzaz will play.
Will Razzaz rely solely on middle class liberal experts to form a Cabinet of technocrats with less emphasis on geography, origin, religion and political affiliations? Or will he seek to build on the political blocks in parliament to form a politically inclusive government that, at least minimally, is based in parliamentary political weight distribution? Will that mean that he will enter into negotiations with the Islamists to bring them to the forefront of his reform efforts, despite their relative absence from the public demonstrations that led to the rise of Razzaz to the prime minister position? Will the growingly influential leftists, and especially those who led the campaign against the income tax draft law from the heart of the professional association, have a say in the makeup of the new government.
The answer lies in the commitment that was made for a new “nahj” or approach to governance in Jordan as per the demands of the demonstrators and their supporters.
This commitment, articulated by King Abdullah in his meeting with the media representatives and later by Razzaz as he artfully diffused the anger of the demonstrators, appeared to underline three core principles: The need to institutionalise the separation of the three authorities, and with it the empowerment of these authorities to deliver on their constitutional mandates, the vital importance of improving the performance of the public sector at all levels in order to deliver its services competently and cost effectively and finally the requirement to invest heavily in political inclusion and representation to widen the baseline of involved and invested Jordanians. A byproduct of the success of these three tacks would necessarily mean a more efficient economy and the success of much-needed strategies for more self-reliance.
In order to achieve success on these quite complex tracks, it would be fair to assume that Razzaz will seek to build a cabinet of so-called political appointees or representatives who are also sector specialists in order to achieve political consensus and buy in from the key power bases representing Jordanians today.
In the absence of a clear political will for a parliamentary government, that approach would be the closest to forming a government that has political legitimacy from the people. It will not be surprising, therefore, to see Razzaz bring in cabinet ministers who are close to the Islamists, leftists, professional associations and parliamentary blocks, as well as those with established social capital in communities outside the capital Amman. Each and every proposed Cabinet minister would be assessed at this stage against what they would add to the political legitimacy and weight of the Cabinet in order to collectively strengthen its hand as it works to achieve a very critical and difficult mandate.
The demographics of these Cabinet ministers must challenge common practice and indicate a serious political will to embrace the so far marginalised population groups, and especially youth and women. Specifically, the selection of youth and women needs to steer away from tokenism and quota mentalities, but focus on raising the profile and political weight of these groups by ensuring that each selection is of exceptional merit and character.
It is clear from the unofficial hum behind Razzaz’s appointment that the political climbers who sought power for themselves will challenge him and his Cabinet, and wherever possible nip at his ankles to undermine this effort. These detractors are not without power or influence and many lie in waiting within the sectors or even authorities that he is mandated to reform.
It is also evident that the political immaturity of the political parties and other political formations will make his task to empower the Cabinet politically more difficult to achieve. Especially that political leadership in Jordan, so far, has been more often than not based on individual achievement, or social contacts, and often lacking a real credible base of followers or the political decision-making cohesiveness that comes with political party leadership in more mature democracies.
Therefore, it is not surprising that Razzaz said that he needs time to select his team members. The formulas are complex and the selection will need to follow proper recruitment practices and extended negotiations to determine political support, as well as sector efficiency and knowledge. It might also mean that Razzaz will not only be looking to identify candidates for the ministerial positions, but also other key senior public sector posts, including those at secretary general level, that are key to the success of a truly efficient government.
The final outcome is critical. This Cabinet will indicate to Jordanians the new premier’s commitment to political inclusion, especially of the so far marginalised groups of youth and women, his ability to negotiate with political “parties” to support his vision and plan for reform as well as the collective credentials of the selected team members to form a baseline of political clout, as well as maintain a balance between political and technocrat credentials. It will also tell Jordanians how much authority he was given to form his team or whether the formation of this government was also influenced by the priorities or preferences of the Royal Court or intelligence department. The final formation effectively will tell Jordanians how powerful is the new premier and, therefore, how able he is to implement a credible and ambitious reform plan.
During last week’s demonstrations against the Income Tax Law proposed by the former government, many political pundits called for a national salvation government. That term had been used before during times of political or economic crises and has come to mean a high-profile government of senior individuals, possibly at prime minister level, that come together to save the country through their combined experience and wisdom, but perhaps not their harmonious collaboration.
I believe what Razzaz has been entrusted by the King and the Jordanian people to put together is exactly a national salvation government. This one, however, will be expected to embrace and maximise the incredible potential of the future of Jordan and engage the country’s citizen agents, not as individuals, but as representatives of legitimate political institutions and formations, including young emerging ones.
National salvation today will, therefore, mean democratic, politically and demographically inclusive and corruption-free governance tasked to efficient, committed Jordanians regardless of age, gender, ethnicity, religion or origin, but with strong consideration of the legitimate weight and value of their political and social representation.