Abu Mohammad Al Julani: From extremist legacy to Syrian political centrality

Since Damascus fell, the name "Abu Mohammad Al-Julani," or Ahmad Al-Sharaa, has taken center stage in Syria's political landscape. The man, once known for leading a hardline jihadist organization, is now positioning himself as an indispensable player in shaping Syria's future. Despite his controversial past, Al-Julani is actively rebranding himself, using political voids and global uncertainty to position as a pragmatic leader ready to guide Syria's reconstruction.

Al-Julani has wasted no time sending multi-level messages aimed at reassuring regional and international stakeholders alike. Regionally, he emphasized that Syria would not serve as a launchpad for attacks on neighboring states or for exporting revolutions, a move aimed at easing long-standing Arab concerns. On the Arab front, Al-Julani has championed the Gulf developmental model, especially Saudi Arabia’s, as a blueprint for Syria’s reconstruction, aiming to secure Gulf support and end his isolation. Internationally, he positioned himself as a party committed to halting terrorist activity within Syria, calling for a pluralistic political model acceptable on a global scale. This aligns with his broader effort to remove Hay’at Tahrir Al Sham (HTS) from terrorist lists and lift international sanctions on Syria, particularly the Caesar Act.

However, maintaining HTS’s position as a primary player in Syria's future comes with significant challenges. Domestically, the group faces difficulties managing local alliances, especially as tensions rise among factions amid the absence of a cohesive vision for political transition. Externally, Syria risks becoming a magnet for extremists, with the resurgence of the Daesh terror group striving to reassert itself as a dominant force on the ground.

Amid these challenges, HTS might find itself compelled to play a major security role in countering Daesh, potentially positioning itself as a partner to the international coalition. This dynamic intersects with Turkey's maneuvers, as Ankara—currently the most prominent actor in Syria—prepares for new military operations targeting Daesh while equating its threat with that of Kurdish forces, thereby legitimizing the targeting of both in tandem.

On another front, despite Al-Julani’s assurances that Syria will not be used as a base for attacks on Israel, Tel Aviv continues to redraw its security maps within Syria, seemingly indifferent to the identity or form of the future Syrian government. Israel’s strategy involves securing key areas deemed non-negotiable while leaving others as bargaining chips for potential political deals with future ruling parties.

Russia, meanwhile, emerges as the biggest loser in this shifting landscape. With mounting international pressure to withdraw from the Eastern Mediterranean, Moscow is seeking new footholds, potentially through agreements with HTS. However, the Western bloc remains more capable of shaping Syria's trajectory, as decisions to rehabilitate HTS and lift sanctions are firmly in Western hands. Should Libya prove an unviable alternative for Moscow, it may resort to escalating tensions in other areas, such as Northern Europe or the Baltic states, as a response to its strategic setbacks.

In this intricate context, the challenges facing Syria continue to mount. The resurgence of Daesh, renewed confrontations in Syria and Iraq, factional divisions, and ongoing arms smuggling all exacerbate instability. If left unaddressed, these challenges could transcend Syria’s borders, morphing into a wider regional crisis.

With Al-Julani's reassurances and strategic maneuvers, Syria’s future remains an open question, with ongoing struggles to shape a war-torn state’s destiny while its emerging leaders become pawns in an increasingly complex global chess game.