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Since the fall of Bashar al-Assad's regime and the rise of a new political order in Syria led by Ahmad al-Sharaa, the Muslim Brotherhood has adopted a notably calm and pragmatic political tone. This is evident in the group’s official statements and the public discourse of its General Controller, Amer al-Bousalama, which consistently emphasize support for political stability and send reassuring messages to the Syrian public and regional Arab states alike. The group even went as far as to praise former U.S. President Donald Trump’s decision to lift sanctions on Syria and to thank Saudi Arabia for what it described as a positive role in facilitating that shift.
However, these public statements do not fully reflect the complex and uneasy relationship between the Brotherhood and the new regime. Behind closed doors, a state of mutual suspicion prevails. To this day, the Brotherhood’s political wing—the National Party for Justice and the Constitution (commonly known as Hizb Al-Wa’ad)—has not been granted legal status, despite repeated attempts to operate within the new legal framework. Informed sources suggest that this refusal goes beyond administrative or legal matters and reflects a calculated stance by al-Sharaa, rooted in deeper considerations involving regional alliances and ideological dynamics.
On the domestic front, the relationship between the Brotherhood and what the Writer terms the “post-jihadist” current—figures who once engaged in jihadist movements but have since transitioned to political leadership—remains fraught with tension and misunderstanding. Al-Sharaa, himself a former jihadist, reportedly remains uncomfortable with the Brotherhood’s long-term political project. From his perspective, the Brotherhood’s strategy of pursuing power through democratic and popular channels—rather than through violence—poses a more significant threat to ruling systems than traditional militant groups.
The regional dimension is even more pivotal. Several influential Arab capitals have expressed clear reservations about the Brotherhood, viewing any openness toward the group in the new Syria as a potential revival of political Islam. A former Arab diplomat confided that many regional powers initially viewed al-Sharaa’s ascent with concern, fearing it would offer “a lifeline to political Islam.” Al-Sharaa understands that his regime’s diplomatic reintegration, regional support, and even financial backing are all contingent upon a firm and visible stance against the return of the Brotherhood to political life. In fact, relations between the Syrian government and several Arab states only improved after receiving explicit assurances—some brokered through Turkish channels—that the Brotherhood would remain excluded from the political equation.
The central paradox is striking: a regime that emerged from the ranks of Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and is led by former jihadists now enjoys a degree of implicit regional acceptance, while a group that has consistently declared its commitment to democratic principles and peaceful engagement remains marginalized. This contradiction underscores an official Arab perception that jihadist groups represent a temporary security threat that can be managed, whereas the Brotherhood—with its transnational networks and ideological longevity—is seen as a more enduring political challenge.
The Brotherhood, for its part, is treading carefully. It is fully aware of the transitional nature of this phase and is avoiding any premature confrontation with the new regime. At the same time, it possesses the organizational experience and patience to remain in the background, awaiting a possible shift in the political or regional landscape. If political space reopens or regional dynamics shift, the Brotherhood is likely to reemerge on the scene.
Ultimately, the relationship between Ahmad al-Sharaa and the Muslim Brotherhood rests on a fragile balance—more of a tactical truce than a strategic alliance. The critical question remains: how long will this balance hold? Or are we simply witnessing a delayed confrontation that could reshape the future of political Islam in Syria?