Mosul — Iraq’s Pandora’s Box

The outcome of the battle to recapture Mosul from Daesh, which appears to have started already, will trigger a number of variables that will eventually impact the future of Iraq as a country, the fate of Iraqi Kurdistan, Iran’s influence over the Baghdad government and the Sunni-Shiite showdown.

The successful retaking of the strategic base of Qayyara, 70km south of Mosul, will give the Iraqi army and coalition forces an important foothold from which to manage the difficult task of conquering Iraq’s second largest city with a population of more than 2 million.

But there are already fears and accusations surrounding the role of the Kurdish peshmerga, a pivotal force in fighting Daesh militants, and how far they will be allowed to occupy contested territory. 

The peshmerga have successfully driven Daesh out of several villages north and east of Mosul. 

The government of Haidar Al Abadi has warned Kurdish forces against entering the city. So did commanders in the Iran backed Popular Mobilisation Units (PMU), a mainly Shiite force notorious for punishing Sunni residents of liberated towns and villages, most recently Fallujah, in Anbar province.

Abadi’s support for the PMU is unshakeable even as Sunni leaders in Baghdad complain about their crimes and atrocities. 

They are joined by controversial Shiite cleric Moqtada Al Sadr, who has become an important player in opposing the ethno-confessional system of government that was established by the US.

The battle for Mosul will be difficult and bloody even as the US claims that Daesh fighters are demoralised and are estimated to be 15,000 to 30,000 strong only.

Mosul being their largest and last remaining base in Iraq, Daesh will put up a big fight. It had plenty of time to prepare for it since it took the city swiftly in 2014.

The size of destruction in Fallujah and Ramadi is a stark reminder of what awaits Mosul. 

The UN estimates that at least 1 million residents will flee towards Iraqi Kurdistan once the fighting begins. 

The humanitarian toll on those who remain will be enormous.

The fall of the city will be celebrated as a major victory against Daesh by Baghdad, the US coalition, the Kurds and Tehran. But no sooner will the city be liberated than schisms will begin.

Sunni residents of so-called liberated towns in Anbar and Salahuddin remain displaced and many have been prevented from returning. 

There are allegations that Iran is having schemes to repopulate Sunni towns in a bid to create a new demographic reality that is sectarian in nature.

The Kurds will be unwilling to withdraw from villages and territory they recently occupied, and there are reports that the peshmerga dug out a 3-metre-wide, 19-kilometre-long trench, marking the new front line after recapturing the village of Qarqashah earlier this month.

Driving them back to earlier positions will not be easy.

And then, there is the PMU and its role in the upcoming battle. 

The US is weary of these forces entering the city and so are the local Sunni tribes in the region. But who will stop them from doing so?

Iran has defended the PMU’s right to fight Daesh in Mosul and reports speak of the arrival of Iranian Gen. Qassem Suleimani south of Mosul to lead these forces.

A local force called National Mobilisation (NM), made up of volunteers from the region, has vowed to fight PMU as fiercely as it would fight Daesh. They accuse the PMU of planning to occupy the city and hand it over to Iran.

The liberation of Mosul will lead to political, sectarian and military aftershocks that will be felt in Erbil, Tehran and Baghdad.

In the case of the US, whose strategy in Iraq has been focused on fighting Daesh and not influencing local politics, the liberation of Mosul will end its role in Iraq, leaving the country to face turmoil and possible partition.

The fall of the city will give Iran more power to implement a sinister policy of demographic reshuffle that falls within a grand scheme of weakening the Sunni component’s presence and influence over the political process.

For the Kurds, the defeat of Daesh will bring to the forefront the issue of seceding from Iraq and setting up their independent state on new territory — equivalent to about 50 per cent of the size of their recognised autonomous zone — that they believe they had rightly won.

The majority of Kurds who support independence cannot miss the opportunity.

But in the case of the Sunni tribes of Nineveh, the lessons of what happened to their brethren in Anbar and Salahuddin are not forgotten, and they will resist attempts to change the ethnic and sectarian make up of their city.

Their confrontation with the PMU is inevitable. 

One thing is for sure, and that is that the outcome of the battle for Mosul will open a Pandora’s Box that will take Iraq into the unknown.

The writer is a journalist and political commentator based in Amman.