Deep state can only be countered through credible democracy

Most recently, Jordanians have been referring to what they call “deep state” or “al dawla al ameeqa” to refer to “shadow” forces that scuttle or hinder reform and political progress in the country. At its most superficial, some of those using the term are pointing to what they believe is a pre-designed policy by senior intelligence officers.  Those in the know, or students of this type of political analysis, understand that this is not necessarily completely accurate and that a so-called “deep state” is borne of a network of players and influencers from multiple sectors, not necessarily at the decision-making level, but who come together to protect their interests. 

In a recent article on the “Deep States in MENA” published by the US-based Middle East policy council, Robert Springborg, a retired professor of national security affairs, argues that so-called deep states can only exist where citizens are unable to freely organise politically, cannot change their governments through elections and are powerless to subordinate militaries and intelligence services to their institutionalised control. 

Springborg’s article reviews the origins of the term and traces its evolution and evidence within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region, while at the same time assessing if the recent attempt in the US to co-locate the term in US politics and tie it to attempts to subvert US President Donald Trump’s policies is valid.

His conclusion on the US is that the link is at best tenuous and the conditions as outlined in his review of manifestations of the deep state are not replicated in the US, where citizens are in fact able to freely organise politically, change their government through elections and also subordinate militaries and intelligence services to the control of the people and their democratic institutions.

But where the article is truly fascinating is in its review of structures, influences, formations and impact of the deep state in our region to show what he says is evidence that "real" politics that determine who gets what, when and how is essentially the preserve of deep states, leaving others with only "pseudopolitics".

I had gone in search for a body of work in the deep state and its indicators because I found recently that the term is being repeatedly used by political analysts in Jordan to explain the inability of successive governments to create any tangible change that can impact the lives and welfare of ordinary citizens. Analysts most often use the term in conversations aided by a knowing look, sideway glance and a sign of resignation implying that we all know who are the architects of the deep state in Jordan and why they are doing it, but we do not have the tools to counter it. 

And when I read in the first few paragraphs of the article that the deep state is effectively a network of influencers, who hatch “secretive conspiracies” in the corridors of power, shadow the country’s politics and undermine democratic process, I admit I also felt that I had hit a jackpot of sorts. 

Although the article does not study Jordan closely enough for us to draw out firm conclusions, it does mark us as the only monarchy that more closely mimics republican states (he believes Israel and most monarchies in MENA do not suffer from deep states) and therefore is afflicted with deep state symptoms. We may have to pause to consider the detailed analysis of the different forms of the deep state that the author of the article posits in order to more closely identify where we are and what “type” of deep state we have, but there is no doubt that we certainly are a good candidate for a case study at minimum. 

Which brings me to the point I need to make. If we are serious about reform, a new social contract, good governance or whatever term we are using now to describe our intended transformative action, then the government must immediately study the manifestations and tactics of the deep state in Jordan, unpack its shadow activity, locate its beneficiaries and then draw out a plan to counter, or at minimum, contain the deep state’s influence in order to liberate a system of governance that promotes the common citizen as the primary beneficiary of the state’s economic and political activity. 

The deep state, by any definition I have read in preparing for this article, is a blocker of any serious effort for reform and for it to be derailed, it has to be studied closer, understood more fully and targeted with more serious cohesive planning for action. That action cannot be haphazard or piecemeal, and to succeed must be adopted by a parallel and organised network, drawing in supporters and influencers from multiple sectors, that is equally obsessed and vigilant about pushing its agenda and protecting its beneficiaries. 

The goal of this effort, and in fact the ultimate beneficiaries of this counter effort, will be without doubt the longevity and steadfastness of the state, the cohesiveness of the nation and the welfare of all citizens equally.

And, in my opinion, herein comes the need for political reform.

If the main objective of this network of detractors is to thwart citizens’ efforts to organise themselves politically and to deny them the opportunity to change their government through election and by deduction build a functioning and credible parliament and political parties feeding into those parliaments, doesn’t it make immediate sense that political reform to maximise citizens’ ability to institutionalise and organise democratic behaviour should be our primary objective? 

I assume in this analysis that the government, and especially the government of Premier Omar Razzaz, at its most senior level is not part of the deep state network. I believe that Jordan falls more within a model of deep state, if I am to follow the deductions of experts on the phenomena, that does not fully nest at the decision-making level or most senior positions, but at the lower layers of the government, military and intelligence, supported by outreach networks into the economic and financial circles that stand to benefit most from paralysing the will of the people.  

It is based on this analysis that I believe, therefore, that senior government decision makers, authorities, the institutions of parliament, political parties and civil society, and with them the ordinary Jordanian people stand to benefit most from countering a deep state in Jordan.

This is a long-term project by all means and Jordanians are not expecting overnight miraculous results but what many are looking to see is evidence of a political will to start the process. Many have hope, and there are many who even have faith, that the government of today will have the courage to seize the reins of change and allow them to be the force behind “real politics”.

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