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Precarious Palestinian reconciliation

Sep 02,2014 - Last updated at Sep 02,2014

Signs of cracks in the short-lived Palestinian reconciliation are appearing too soon.

The agreement reached between Palestinian rival factions, Hamas in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah last April fell instantly under attack. Israel blamed Mahmoud Abbas for accommodating the “terrorists” and for bestowing undue legitimacy on them.

One of the undeclared goals of the July Israeli onslaught on Gaza was to destroy the said reconciliation by ending the existence of Hamas, paving the way for returning the densely populated coastal strip to Abbas’ PA.

Israel’s arrogant military adventure proved to be counterproductive. Hamas and the other resistance factions emerged stronger, more confident and far more defiant.

Neither by massive military force nor by intensive diplomatic pressure during the Cairo talks for ceasefire was there any chance of enabling a PA role in Gaza.

The national unity government, which had been formed just before the attack, was in fact hailed as a major Palestinian breakthrough by many who hitherto persistently blamed the Palestinians’ failure to reconcile their differences.

The Israeli war on Gaza strengthened, rather than crack, the Ramallah-Gaza agreement.

Although Azzam Al Ahmad, who led the joint Palestinian delegation to the Cairo negotiations, is known to be a prominent Fateh leader and an often Hamas critic, he defended Hamas’ conditions for accepting the truce.

Only because the Hamas position was adopted by the joint delegation was it partially approved; had it not been the case, the final truce terms, already considered incomplete, would not have been reasonably adequate.

The Palestinian reconciliation has survived the Israeli onslaught only because the two main Palestinian sides, Fateh and Hamas, could not afford to allow their differences to surface while Gazans were subjected to one of the most vicious and indiscriminate lethal attacks in recent times.

But if the war helped keep the sides together, its end, on the other hand, further exposed the real gap that existed before, during and after last April reconciliation.

The roots of the Palestinian division are deeper than goodwill alone can address.

The Palestinian split is not the outcome of power struggle, whims or bad political conduct. It is actually the result of two diverging strategies, with one, the PA, insisting that negotiations and negotiations alone should be the road for pursuing Palestinian rights, while the other, Hamas and the resistance organisations, counter by saying that 20 years of negotiations have only accumulated major losses and humiliating retreat, and therefore the only effective alternative is active military resistance to support any future negotiations.

This view has been strengthened during the war, as the resistance, with its very simple defence means, did extremely well even when confronting the massive power of the attacking army.

The contrast has hardly been sharper between bankrupt grovelling and sterile negotiations, on the one hand, and a determined resistance that surprised the world with its heroic performance and inflicted heavy casualties on the invaders, depriving them of realising any of their declared war aims, on the other.

In theory, the Palestinians are united and all factions fall under one national unity government that should represent all Palestinians.

That, however, is incompatible with the reality.

PA President Abbas has barely refrained from addressing Hamas as a distinct entity. He blamed Hamas at the beginning of the war for unnecessarily provoking the war.

A few days ago, Abbas complained about the existence of a “shadow government” in Gaza. He again blamed Hamas for prolonging the war by delaying acceptance of truce.

Such provocative and antagonistic statements constitute a very serious accusation: Israel has been claiming all along that the huge civilian death toll and the massive destruction in Gaza, though done by Israeli hands, should be blamed on Hamas because its rejection of the Egyptian ceasefire paper at the beginning compelled Israel to continue its barbaric murder.

Abbas is not necessarily wrong to seek a peaceful settlement that can be reached through negotiations, as such a course would in his view be more acceptable to the so-called international community.

One problem is that the kind of negotiations conducted so far was only good as cover for Israel’s continued colonisation of Palestinian land and denial of Palestinian rights.

The other problem is Abbas’ reluctance to pursue the more effective legal course, also peaceful, by taking Israeli war crimes, not this war, not the previous one, to the International Criminal Court.

There is no explanation for persistently delaying this constant Palestinian demand, except the fear of angering PA financiers in Israel, the US and probably the EU, thus trading national rights for short-term privileges and cash.

While resistance does not mean fighting, negotiation does not mean surrender. They go together and buttress each other.

To take Israel to the ICC is as effective as military-style resistance. It strengthens the negotiator at the table and it is perfectly  peaceful.

Israel never agreed to suspend settlement construction during the negotiations, though the practice of colonisation of occupied land is simply illegal.

The PA should not agree to suspend any moves at the UN, including taking its case to all relevant UN organisations, particularly the ICC, because such practice is purely legal.

The sad reality is that Palestinians remain divided. 

The war has exposed the rift between two contradictory courses of action.

Abbas will fight for his political existence now that the war outcome tipped the balance in favour of the resistance.

He came up with a political plan which may buy him little time, but no fruits.

He wants the UN to end the occupation.

Really? Is it that simple, and if so, why wait this long?

He will take his time-limited plan to end the occupation to the Americans first. If they refuse it, he will take it to the Security Council and if the Council does not act on it, he will activate other options.

Do we not know the answers right now?

Washington will say no, and so will the US-controlled Security Council.

Why not save the time and go to the ICC right away?

But the idea is to delay this particular measure and therefore take a long political detour.

Is this a setback? 

Maybe. But most likely, it is an inevitable post-war political adjustment.

Let us wait and see what shape it will take.

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