The missing strategy to face Daesh

Daesh forces continue their advance in Iraq and Syria; their recent territorial gains were significant.

In Iraq, they defeated the Iraqi forces in Anbar’s provincial capital of Ramadi, occupied the city and are continuing their offensive towards Habbaniyyah. They are closing down on the capital Baghdad.

The performance of the Iraqi army and the militias supporting it does not give any hope that the Daesh offensive will be checked any time soon.

The battle to liberate Tikrit was the only one the Iraqi government forces were victorious in so far. But the success in that battle is largely attributed to the massive aerial support of the American forces.

The Iraqi forces were also helped by Iran. Rather than boosting morale and generating momentum, that military success was partly counterproductive.

Despite repeated warnings foreign countries as well as human rights organisations send the Iraqi government to make it stop the atrocities of the Shiite militias against the Sunni population in the areas regained from Daesh, such atrocities reportedly continued in Tikrit in even uglier forms.

The sectarian rift as a result has been deepened.

The Sunni tribes could have played a major role in the war against Daesh if they would have been given the chance.

The previous sectarian government of Nouri Al Maliki was openly opposed to giving the Sunnis of Iraq any role.

When Maliki appealed for American support following the fall of the province of Nineveh and its capital, Mosul, in June last year, he was asked by Washington to form a government that represented all Iraqis first. He failed to accomplish that and, as a result, had to go.

The general feeling is that his successor is not doing any better with respect to the growing sectarian gap in the country.

Sunni tribes complain about being deprived of weapons needed to defend their areas against Daesh attacks and about atrocities committed against them by Shiite militias fighting with the army, based on allegations that they helped “Sunni” Daesh.

The absence of a comprehensive Iraqi government strategy to deal with Daesh has only been helping this kind of national fragmentation. Yet what is needed is not just an Iraqi strategy.

The Daesh threat, which is becoming more serious by the day, requires a regional, even international, strategy.

The coalition that was formed late last year has not been of any value. It did not even weaken Daesh, let alone reverse its territorial gains in Syria and Iraq.

The Security Council’s position on the deteriorating situation has been equally worthless.

Terrorists function outside the law. They do not pay any attention to what states or international organisations decide or say. They use force, illegally of course, and the only way to eliminate them altogether is counterforce.

The international strategy urgently needed is not to issue Security Council statements or further condemnations of the terrorists’ actions, but a military plan to fight them.

The shocking fall of Ramadi in Iraq and of Palmyra in Syria to this terrorist group should only intensify the demand for a new, different, international approach, as this terrorist movement is targeting everyone, or a regional approach with credible and reliable international support.

Clearly this fighting force is getting stronger and wealthier as it still controls oil and gas fields and openly sells these precious commodities. It still attracts recruits; it has limitless supply of arms and munitions; and it definitely fights better than the soldiers it targets.

Syrian and Iraqi soldiers, on the other hand, seem either unable or unwilling to put up a fight. 

Soldiers fight to win, not to lose. Motivated soldiers may risk their lives for a worthy cause, and they never want to die in vain.

The Syrian army must be exhausted, having fought a terrible war for over four years. Its mounting losses must further increase its conviction that it cannot win.

That is why soldiers increasingly tend to abandon bases and flee for their lives. One defeat is strongly demoralising.

The same applies to Iraq and the outcome is frightening.

The troubling question is: If we all, without exception, are threatened by Daesh — Arab states, followers of all religions, foreign countries, culture as well as societies — why do we not unite to confront the danger?

United we have more than we need to deal with the danger in a very short time. Is it not a well-known phenomenon that our common enemy unites us?

Normally yes, but in this case, we, in this region, have not been able to work together even if that is in the best interest of all of us.

One major cause of the general failure is that the regional conflicts are too deep to be put temporarily on hold even for the type of threat Daesh poses.

The tendency, instead, seems to be to use Daesh to promote individual agendas, even if the certain outcome is terrible.

Some, for example, want a Daesh defeat not to benefit the Iraqi Sunnis or to grant Iran political advantage, or to benefit Bashar Assad’s regime or to enhance Hizbollah’s position in Lebanon. For those, the Daesh threat serves a purpose, albeit of temporary nature.

Israel must be delighted that the entire potential of the region is been depleted in internal conflicts, with the expectation that such a war may last for years.

Developments in Yemen are gradually leading to a Syrian style crisis, with perpetual internal war and regional involvement for years to follow very likely.

Does that mean the required strategy against Daesh would only be possible if there were regional understanding on all the other issues?

Apparently yes, and that may be a long way to go.