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Cairo talks unlikely to succeed

Aug 19,2014 - Last updated at Aug 19,2014

The very simple reason for believing that the Cairo talks are not likely to succeed is that the Gaza siege will not be lifted the way the Palestinian resistance factions demand.

Objections to this particular demand do not come only from the Israelis. Many others subscribe to the concept that severe restrictions should apply if there is any agreement that the crossing points into and out of Gaza, on the Egyptian or Israeli side, should be normally opened.

The EU, which placed monitors on the Rafah border with Egypt as part of a previous agreement, is offering to send monitors again.

There is also talk of putting the Gaza Strip under the Palestinian Authority forces — Mahmoud Abbas’ presidential guards were specifically mentioned for the task — as a guarantee that Hamas and other resistance organisations would not smuggle in any military material.

Both options are deeply flawed because while talking about lifting the siege, such ideas are precisely meant to maintain the siege, albeit in a different form. Therefore, they should not be ever considered.

Rafah is a city half Egyptian half Palestinian; it has been so since the border was delineated in the 1920s.

Except for the period of direct Israeli occupation of Gaza, from 1967 till 2005, the Rafah border fell under the sole control of the Egyptians, and Palestinians and Israelis had nothing to do with it.

The 2005 Rafah crossing agreement, which was tailored to meet Israel’s specific conditions at the time, was offensive to Egyptians and Palestinians, reflecting the mistrust of the Israelis who insisted not only on placing third-party observers, the Europeans, but also on monitoring the border themselves by remote controlled cameras with Egyptian acquiescence.

Because that constituted serious infringing on both sides’ sovereignty, the Egyptians’ in particular, it should not be allowed to happen again.

The talk about bringing in the PA to control Gaza ignores the fact that it, at least in theory, does control Gaza.

Just before Israel decided to attack Gaza, the Palestinians had agreed to reconcile their differences, to form a national unity government and to start a process of adjustment of the entire administration in both West Bank and Gaza, but the attack destroyed and disrupted everything.

That was also part of the aggression plan; Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu wasted no time in condemning the reconciliation and blaming Abbas for bringing the terrorists in his authority.

Netanyahu offered Abbas the choice between Hamas or peace, as if he had left the PA with any hope for peace after blocking every attempt his American allies tried to at least keep the talks alive.

Admittedly, the PA’s responsibility in justifying the assumption that the reconciliation did not actually unite the two sides behind one policy cannot be overlooked.

It took time before Ramallah started to cautiously condemn Israel’s vicious attack. Before, and until the resistance stunned the world with its heroic performance and professionalism, confidently confronting Israel’s criminality and massive firepower, there were odd PA voices casting doubt on the wisdom of provoking a superior occupier with clear insinuation that Hamas was to blame.

It is actually the spectacular performance of the resistance that rendered all previous assumptions null and void.

For years, many believed, and indeed conspired, to spread PA control over Gaza, once any of the attempted plans, including this current aggression, to defeat Hamas had worked, but all have failed.

Obviously defeating Hamas would have led instantly to handing Gaza over to the PA, not under the reconciliation formula though. Hamas, then, with its resistance partners, would be wiped out of the Palestinian equation.

That was the desired outcome of this recent onslaught, the latest such attempt.

Having failed, Israel, ignoring the fact that the Palestinians are no more divided, is trying to achieve at the Cairo negotiations what its forces have miserably failed to achieve in battle: disarm Hamas, redesign the siege, bring in the PA forces to control the strip and eradicate any symptom of resistance, and to provide Israeli settlers in south Palestine with the security they require.

Contrary to what the designers of this war had anticipated, the steadfastness of the resistance has unified all Palestinians behind it, not only in Gaza but in the West Bank as well.

We have not yet seen the full effect of this foolish Israeli adventure in Gaza, not in terms of major world opinion transformation vis-à-vis Israel’s brutal massacres against, and massive property destruction of defenceless Palestinians, and not with respect to certain repercussions within the Israeli society, where many felt let down by a reckless military adventure that only exposed the ugly face of Israel’s cruelty towards civilians, without achieving any of its loudly claimed goals.

This war is an eye-opener to a world that had hitherto been taking for granted Israel’s victimisation by ruthless and aimless Palestinian “terror”.

Even if in a future arrangement the PA returns to Gaza, it will never be able to duplicate the West Bank doctrine of policing the occupation in favour of the occupier.

When faced with the choice between those who fought with unprecedented heroism and dedication for their land, their people, their dignity and their honour and the others who were recruited and trained to suppress their own people to provide the occupier with comfort and free security, the Palestinians would know where to go.

The resistance that managed to deal with full-fledged Israeli land, air and sea attacks is not going to easily submit to any other force.

Neither would the resistance abandon its cause if so advised by a PA that based its entire strategy on subservience to the Israelis and their international backers in return for funding and comfortable positions.

Evidently, both sides at the Cairo talks need to reach an agreement for a long-term truce. Both know that renewed fighting would have severe consequences and a heavy political cost.

While the Palestinians, despite any pressure from their hosts, will not accept half solutions, neither will they consider granting the Israelis any easy concessions.

Israel will retaliate by not agreeing to lift the siege.

In the absence of an effective, credible and objective third-party pressure, the talks will fail. That does not mean an immediate return to the guns, but any de facto ceasefire without agreement will be fragile and temporary.

All indications from Cairo so far point to an unfortunate outcome: no agreement.

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